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Contino: Retroactivity of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Landgraf v. USI Fi

COMMENT
RETROACTIVITY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1991: LAND GRAF v. USI FILM PRODUCTS AND
RIVERS V ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 102nd Congress enacted the Civil Right Acts of 1991' ("Act").
The Act in part responded to a number of 1989 Supreme Court decisions 2 which curtailed the rights of employees under the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866' and 1964. 4 The Act also provided "additional remedies
under Federal law ...needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace" and "provide[d] additional
protections against unlawful discrimination in employment."' Missing
from the Act, however, was a clear congressional statement indicating
whether the Act was to be applied retroactively or prospectively. It was
unclear whether the Act was to be applied prospectively-i.e., only to
cases where the cause of action arose after the effective date of the
enactment--or if it was to be applied retroactively-i.e., to cases pending
on appeal as of the effective date, to cases in which there had been no
decision as of the effective date, and to cases where the conduct took
I. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.).
2. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)) (specifically stating that one of the purposes of the Act is "to
respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights
statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination"). Cases overruled by
the Act include Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989); Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
and 8 U.S.C.).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 5 U.S.C.).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2(1), 2(3), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
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place before the effective date but in which the complaint was filed postenactment. To resolve this issue, the courts were left with an ambiguous
statute, the Act's legislative history which provided no reliable guidance,6 and two conflicting judicial presumptions.7 Unable to resolve this
ambiguity, the federal courts were split on the issue of the Act's

application, forcing the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Landgrafv.
USI Film Products8 and Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.9 to determine
whether the Civil Rights Act of 1991 would be applied retroactively or
prospectively.
After a bench trial in Landgraf, the District Court found that
although the plaintiff, Barbara Landgraf, had been sexually harassed by
a co-worker at USI Film Products, the harassment was not severe enough
to justify Landgraf's resignation.' Thus, Landgraf's employment was
not terminated in violation of Title VII and she was denied equitable
relief." While her appeal was pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
was enacted.' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Landgraf's
argument for retroactive application of section 102 of the Act, which

6. See, e.g., Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397,
1406 (2nd Cir. 1993); Davis v. City of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1553 (9th Cir. 1992); Gersman
v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1642 (1994);
Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641
(1994); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1372 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1641 (1994); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 934 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594, 598 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992); cf. Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1378 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding the Act's legislative history dispositive of the issue of retroactivity---"[w]hen a bill
mandating retroactivity fails to pass, and a law omitting that mandate is then enacted, the legislative
intent was surely that the new law be prospective only").
7. See Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (setting forth the
principle that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing
so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary."). Contra Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (setting forth the
principal that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law. Thus, congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result"). This conflict was recognized by the Supreme Court in Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.
v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), but was left unresolved. Id. at 837.
8. 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1994).
9. 114S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (1994).
10. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1488.
11. Id.
12. Id; see Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.).
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would have entitled her to compensatory and punitive damages, as well
as a jury trial. 3
In Rivers, the petitioners, Rivers and Davison, filed a claim pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that they were discharged from their
employment due to "baseless charges because of their race and because
they had insisted on the same procedural protections afforded white
employees." 4 Before trial, the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, which interpreted the "make and
enforce contracts" clause of section 1981 not to apply to "conduct which
occurs after the formation of a contract and which does not interfere with
the right to enforce established contract obligations." 5 The district court
dismissed Rivers's and Davison's section 1981 claims based upon the
Patterson decision. 6 While the Rivers case was pending on appeal, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted. Petitioners argued for application
of section 101 of the Act 7 which abrogated the decision in Patterson.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument that section
101 of the Act applied retroactively to the case pending. 8
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and provides an overview of the effect of
its changes. Part H addresses the split among the federal courts and the
reasoning that supported the conclusions reached---i.e., whether the Act

13. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 433 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 1483
(1994). Section 102(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:

In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination... and provided that the complaining party cannot recover

under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981), the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to

any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the
respondent.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)). Section 102(c) provides in pertinent part: "Ifa complaining
party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section--(1) any party may demand a trial
by jury."
14.
15.
16.

Id. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073.
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1513 (1994).
491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989).
Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514.

17. Section 101(b) of the Act provides: "For purposes of this section, the term 'make and
enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and

the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § 101(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)

(1994)).
18. Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490,491 (6th Cir. 1992), aff'd and remanded,
Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1514 (1994).
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is to be applied retroactively or prospectively. Part IV examines the
Supreme Court's decisions in Landgrafand Rivers, both of which hold
that the Act is to have prospective application. 9 Part IV.C of the
Comment discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Court's analysis,
the questions left unanswered by the decisions, and how the lower federal
courts have responded to the Supreme Court's holdings in Landgrafand
Rivers. Finally, Part V concludes that the Court failed in its duty as
"final arbiter" thus leaving room for disagreement and speculation among
the federal courts.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
OVER-SWEEPING EFFECT

1991 AND ITS

In response to a number of Supreme Court cases in 1989 that
severely restricted the rights guaranteed to employees under the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964 to be free from unlawful discrimination,2"
the 101st Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990.21 The 1990 Act
sought to overrule these decisions as well as to restore and strengthen
civil rights.22 President Bush eventually vetoed the Bill,2 3 asserting
disapproval of the effect that the 1990 Act would have on
employers-i.e., creating "powerful incentives for employers to adopt
hiring and promotion quotas. 24 Congress failed to override the veto.25
Sent back to the drawing board, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 199126 after a series of compromises. One of the most controversial issues was the effective date of the enactment. The 1990 Act had

19. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1508 (1994); Rivers, 114 S.Ct. at 1515.

20. See 136 CONG. REc. S1025 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Cranston
recognizing that "last year's Supreme Court decisions dealt a crippling blow to the ability of victims
of job discrimination to litigate cases under Federal civil rights statutes").
21. 136 CONG. REc. H9552 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) (reprinting the final version of the bill

(S.2104)).
22. See 136 CONG. REc. S1018 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
In the past year, however, the Supreme Court has issued a series of rulings that
mark an abrupt and unfortunate departure from its historic vigilance in protecting civil

rights. The fabric of justice has been tom. Significant gaps have been opened in the
existing laws that prohibit racism and other types of bias in our society.
The Civil Rights Act of 1990 is intended to overturn these Court decisions and
restore and strengthen these basic laws.

Id.
23. See 136 CONG. REc. S16,418 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).
24. Id.
25. 136 CONG. REc. S16,589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
26. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.).
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broad retroactivity provisions, which went so far as to open up final
judgments, provided that certain criteria were met.27 However, section
402(a) of the 1991 Act provides: "Except as otherwise specifically
provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect
upon enactment. ' 28 Meanwhile, sections 109(c) and 402(b) explicitly
provide for prospective application. 29 There were also a number of
conflicting statements made on the floor of the Senate, discussing
whether the Act was intended to be applied retroactively or prospectively.30 Senator Kennedy, one of the sponsors of the bill, recognized that
"it will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will
apply to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment. 3 1
To the contrary, Senator Danforth, also a sponsor of the bill, recognized
the conflicting precedent, i.e. Bradley and Bowen,32 but specifically
stated that the sponsors disapprove of the Bradley line of cases and do
not intend for the bill to have retroactive effect. 33 After much debate,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed in the Senate on October 30,
1991, 34 and in the House on November 6, 1991. 31 President Bush
signed the Act into law on November 21, 1991.36

27. See 136 CONG. REc. H9552, 9554 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) reprinting S.2104, § 15; see
also 136 CONG. REc. S16,418, 16,419 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (Pres. Bush's veto message returning
without approval S.2104, criticizing its "unfair retroactivity rules").
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 402(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1099
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 1981 note (1994)).
29. Section 109(c) provides as follows: "The amendments made by this section shall not apply
with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act." Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note
(1994)). Section 402(b) provides as follows: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act,
nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before
Mar. 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after Oct. 30, 1983." Id. § 402(b), 105
Stat. at 1099. For a detailed discussion of the significance given to these two provisions, see infra
notes 64-68, 88-90 and accompanying text.
30. See 137 CONG. REc. S15,325 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth: "I
simply want to state that a court would be well advised to take with a large grain of salt floor debate
and statements placed into the CONGRESSIONAL REcoRD which purport to create an interpretation
for the legislation that is before us.").
31. 137 CONG. REc. S15,485 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
32. See supra note 7.
33. 137 CONG. REC. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth: "Our
intention in drafting the effective date provision was to adhere to the principle followed by the vast
majority of Supreme Court cases and exemplified by Bowen and Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Bonjomo.").
34. See 137 CONG. Rc. S15,503 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991).
35. See 137 CONG. REc. H9416 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1991).
36. See President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Book II, 1991 PUB.
PAPERs 1504 (Nov. 21, 1991).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

5

Hofstra
Law LAW
Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [1995], [Vol.
Art. 12
HOFSTRA
REVIEW
24:541

As one of the purposes of the Act was to respond to a number of
Supreme Court decisions,37 section 101 of the 1991 Act3 8 abrogated
the decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.39 Patterson limited
section 1981 claims to conduct which occurs at the initial formation of
the contract and conduct which interferes with the right to enforce
established contract obligations. On the other hand, section 101 of the
Act expands the scope of section 1981 claims by defining the "make and
enforce contracts" clause to include all contractual relations."
Section 107 of the 1991 Act also abrogated the decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,4 which allowed a respondent to a Title VII
claim to avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the same decision would have been made absent the discriminatory
factors. To the contrary, section 107 provides that "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice." 42
Section 105 of the 1991 Act abrogated the decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio,4 3 which shifted the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases from employers to employees." Consequently, employees
were faced with the difficult burden of proving that the discrimination
was caused by a specific employment practice.4 5 Section 105 of the Act
shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent "to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related4 6for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.
In addition, section 108 of the Act limited the decision in Martin v.

37. See supra note 2.
38. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994)). See supra note 17 for text of § 101(b) of the 1991 Act.
39. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
40. See supra note 17.
41. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

42. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994)).
43. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
44. Id. at 656-61.
45. This decision overruled the longstanding unanimous opinion joined by all members except
Justice Brennan, who took no part in the consideration of the case, and authored by Chief Justice
Burger in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424.

46. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1994)).
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Wilks, 7 which held that parties who failed to intervene in earlier
employment discrimination proceedings in which consent decrees were
entered, would be permitted to challenge employment decisions made
pursuant to those decrees. Section 108 of the Act limits the circumstances
where consent decrees may be reopened. a8
Finally, section 112 of the Act extends the statute of limitations
period for filing a claim of discrimination based on a seniority system.49
This provision abrogated the Supreme Court decision in Lorance v.
AT & T Technologies, Inc.,5" which held that the statute of limitations
begins to run at the time of the adoption of the seniority system.5
In short, the 1991 Act "restores" many of the rights eroded by the
Supreme Court's recent decisions, as well as provides additional remedies
and protections to victims of discrimination. For example, the section
involved in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,5 2 provides an additional
remedy of compensatory damages in cases of intentional discrimination,
as well as punitive damages in grievous cases. 3 In addition, section 109
of the Act extends civil rights protection to American employees who
work in foreign countries for United States employers.5
The above are only a few of the areas of employment discrimination
that were amended by the 1991 Act. Because of the controversy that
surrounded the passage of the bill, however, Congress was unable to
agree on the proper application of the Act to pending cases and left this
issue for the courts to resolve. It is this ambiguity that lead to the split
among the federal courts.
I.

THE SPLIT AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS

After the passage of the Act, cases before the court arose in the
context of three different procedural postures which may have been
determinative in the courts' analysis of the application of the Act to

47. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
48. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (1994)).
49. Id. § 112, 105 Stat. at 1078-79.
50. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
51. Id. at 911.
52. 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994).
53. See supra note 13 for the text of § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
54. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077-78 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)). This provision overruled the Supreme Court's decision
in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), which held that Title VII claims did not
apply to employment practices United States employers when conducted outside the United States.
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preenactment conduct: (1) cases that were decided before the 1991 Act
came into effect, but were still pending on appeal when the effective date
occurred; 55 (2) cases in which there was no decision as of the effective
date of the Act;56 and (3) cases in which the conduct took place before
the effective date but the complaint was filed post-enactment. A
majority of the federal courts took the position that the Act was to be
prospective only. 8 However, while many of these courts agreed that the
Act was to be applied prospectively, they reached this conclusion on a
very different analysis of the law.
In deciding the issue of retroactivity, the Second Circuit in Butts v.

55. Cases deciding that the Act was to be applied prospectively include Vance v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 983 F.2d 1573 (l1th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1110 (1995); Hicks v.
Brown Group, Inc., 982 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1642 (1994); Baynes v.
AT & T Technologies, Inc., 976 F.2d 1370 (1Ith Cir. 1992); Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975
F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1642 (1994); Holt v. Michigan Dep't of
Corrections, 974 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994); Rowe v. Sullivan,
967 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1992); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 114
S. Ct. 1483 (1994); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1641 (1994); Luddington v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994); Mozee v. American Comm. Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir, 1992);
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992).
Two cases decided in the Ninth Circuit---the only circuit to decide that the Act was to be
applied retroactively-include Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993); Davis v.
City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992).
56. Cases deciding that the Act was to be applied prospectively include Mojica v. Gannett Co.,
7 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1643 (1994); Butts v. City of New York Dep't
of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1993); Curtis v. Metro Ambulance Serv., 982
F.2d 472 (11 th Cir. 1993); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), aff dand
remanded, Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994); Sussman v. Salem, Saxon &
Nielson, P.A., 815 F. Supp. 1447 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
Cases deciding that the Act was to be applied retroactively include Assily v. Tampa Gen.
Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 862 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. I11.
1992); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); King v. Shelby Med. Ctr.,
779 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
57. Cases deciding that the Act was to be applied prospectively include Bakhtiary v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., No. Civ. A. HAR. 93-333, 1993 WL 299201 (D. Md. July 22, 1993); Cohen v.
Austin, 826 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Cases deciding that the Act was to be applied retroactively include Duplessis v. Training &
Dev. Corp., 821 F. Supp. 45 (D. Me. 1993); Bland v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 811 F. Supp. 571 (D.
Colo. 1992); Jaekel v. Equifax Mktg. Decision Sys., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Va. 1992).
58. Mojica, 7 F.3d 552; Butts, 990 F.2d 1397; Vance, 983 F.2d 1573; Curtis, 982 F.2d 472;
Hicks, 982 F.2d 295; Baynes, 976 F.2d 1370; Gersman, 975 F.2d 886; Holt, 974 F.2d 771; Harvis,
973 F.2d 490; Rowe, 967 F.2d 186; Landgraf,968 F.2d 427; Johnson, 965 F.2d 1363; Luddington,
966 F.2d 225; Mozee, 963 F.2d 929; Fray, 960 F.2d 1370; Vogel, 959 F.2d 594; Bakhtiary, 1993
WL 299201; Cohen, 826 F. Supp. 922; Sussman, 815 F. Supp. 1447.
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City of New York Department of Housing Preservation &
Development59 examined the Act's legislative history, the language of
60
the Act, and the significance of the two prospective-only provisions
and struggled with the two conflicting judicial presumptions.6 Recognizing that Congress intentionally left the issue of retroactivity to the
courts, the circuit court found that the legislative history of the Act and
the Act's language provided no helpful guidance in resolving the
issue.6" The court looked to the floor speeches made by the Senators
and Representatives but noted that the "'contemporaneous remarks of a
sponsor of legislation are certainly not controlling in analyzing legislative
history."' 63 Furthermore, in rejecting the interpretation adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Estate of Reynolds v. Martin,'4 the court read the two

provisions which explicitly provided for prospective-only application as
"'insurance policies' against the possibility that a court would deem the
entire Act to apply retroactively., 65 The court did agree with the
Reynolds court, in stating that "it is the duty of reviewing courts to give
effect to every clause and word of a statute where possible. ' 66 However,

59. 990 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1993).
60. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 109(c), 402(b), 105 Stat. 1071,
1077, 1099, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994)).
61. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1405-11; see also supra note 7 (presenting the conflicting judicial
presumptions set forth in Bradley and Bowen).
62. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1406, 1409.
63. Id. at 1405 (quoting Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n.15 (1982)); see also
Continental Can Co. v. Chicago Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1990).
The text of the statute, and not the private intent of the legislators, is the law. Only the
text survived the complex process for proposing, amending, adopting, and obtaining the
President's signature .... It is easy to announce intents and hard to enact laws; the
Constitution gives force only to what is enacted.
Id. at 1157.
64. 985 F.2d 470,471 (9th Cir. 1993) (deciding that the Act is to be applied retroactively). For
the Reynolds court interpretation, see infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing Davis v.
City of San Francisco).
65. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1408; accordGersman v. Group Health Ass'n, 975 F.2d 886, 890 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), cert.denied, 114 S.Ct. 1642 (1994); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 137273 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1641 (1994); Mozee v. American Commercial Marine
Ser. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 933 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 207 (1992).
66. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1408; see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35
(1992) (recognizing "the settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that
every word has some operative effect"); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (stating
that "the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation [is] that no provision should be construed to be
entirely redundant'); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (recognizing "the elementary
canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative");
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961) (refusing to "adopt a strained reading
[ofa statute] which renders one part a mere redundancy'); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528,
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in doing so, it did not resolve the retroactivity issue. Rather, the court
gave significance to the clause "except as otherwise specifically
provided" in section 402(a) of the Act, 67 as referring to those provisions
in the Act which required reports and appointments to be made in the
future.6 8 Concluding that the legislative history and the language of the
Act did not resolve the issue of retroactivity, the court turned to two
established judicial presumptions to be applied when a statute is silent
with respect to retroactivity.
In 1974, the Supreme Court set forth the principle that "a court is

to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing
so would result in [a] manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or
legislative history to the contrary."69 By contrast, in 1988 the Supreme
Court noted that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law [and] congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language [specifically] requires this
result."70 To resolve what seems to be an apparent controversy between
these two cases, the Second Circuit adopted the view set forth by Justice
Scalia in his concurrence in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v.
Bonjorno.71 "Justice Scalia wrote: 'It is doubtful ... whether the
Thorpe-Bradley presumption of retroactivity survives at all. If it does,

538 (1955) (stating that "'[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to
destroy' (quoting National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937))).
67. See supra text accompanying note 28 for the full text of § 402(a).
68. See Butts, 990 F.2d at 1408 (referring to §§ 204(b) and 303(b)(4) of the Act), cf Estate
of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting § 402(b) in conjunction with
§§ 109 (c) and 402(a) which provided for explicit prospective application, to conclude that the 1991
Act was to be applied retroactively). For the full text of §§ 204(b) and 303(b)(4) of the Act, see Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1084-85, 1089 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e note
(1994) and 2 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(4) (1994) respectively).
69. Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696,711 (1974). For earlier precedent supporting
this principle, see Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law
intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its
obligation denied. If the law be constitutional... I know of no court which can contest
its obligation. It is true that in mere private cases between individuals, a court will ....
by a retrospective operation, affect the rights of parties, but in great national concerns... the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to set
aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which cannot be affirmed but in violation
of law, the judgment must be set aside.
Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 282 (quoting United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110

(1801)).
70. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
71. 494 U.S. 827 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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however, it only survives (as it was begotten) as a special rule applicable
to changes in law after initial adjudication.' ' 2 Consequently, since there
had been no adjudication at the time of the passage of the 1991 Act and
since the cause of action accrued prior to the 1991 Act's effective date,
the court followed the presumption in Bowen and decided that the Act
should be applied prospectively.73
On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit decided the issue of retroactivity without ever resolving the apparent conflict between Bradley and
Bowen. In Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 4 the court found that
under either presumption the Act would be applied prospectively.7" The
court found the Act's legislative history to be dispositive of the issue,
and that therefore under the Bradley presumption there was "legislative
history to the contrary" which supported prospective application.7 6 The
court reasoned:
[T]he President vetoed a bill containing an explicit retroactivity
provision. That veto could not be overridden and a compromise bill
omitting those provisions was then enacted. Whatever ambiguities may
be found elsewhere in the Act and its legislative history, we think this
history is dispositive, even under Bradley. When a bill mandating
retroactivity fails to pass, and a law omitting that mandate is then
enacted, the legislative intent was surely that the new law be prospective only; any other conclusion simply ignores the realities of the
legislative process.'
The Fifth Circuit also decided that the Act was to have prospective
application, but again, this decision was based upon a different analysis.
After finding the Act's legislative history and language ineffectual in
resolving the retroactivity issue, the circuit court in Johnson v. Uncle
Ben ', Inc.7" also turned to judicial presumptions.79 However, rather
than choosing between Bradley and Bowen, the court turned to yet

72. Butts v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Housing, 990 F.2d 1397, 1410 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Kaiser, 494 U.S. at 854 (Scalia, J., concurring)).

73. Butts, 990 F.2d at 1411.
74. 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992).
75. Id. at 1378.
76. Id. The Eighth Circuit was the only circuit to find the legislative history of the Act to be
dispositive of the issue. For cases that found the legislative history to provide no reliable guidance,
see supra note 6.
77. Fray, 960 F.2d at 1378 (citing NoRMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 48.04 (5th ed. 1992)).
78. 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1641 (1994).

79. Id. at 1373.
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another canon of construction."0 The court relied on a 1985 Supreme
Court decision" in which "[i]n distinguishing Bennett from Bradley, the
Supreme Court noted that the rule in Bradley was limited by 'another
venerable rule of statutory interpretation, i.e., that statutes affecting
substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective
effect."'8 2 Without further explanation, the Johnson court concluded that
83
section 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 affects substantive rights.
Thus, the circuit court refused to apply the Act retroactively, and
affirmed the district court's finding under the law previously established
by the 4 Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
8
Union.
A minority of the federal courts decided that the Act was to have
retroactive effect.8 5 However, similar to the majority of federal courts,
while they agreed on the ultimate conclusion of retroactive application,
they reached this conclusion by widely divergent analyses.
The Ninth Circuit was the only court of appeals to decide that the
Act was to be applied retroactively. In Davis v. City and County of San
Francisco,6 the circuit court found clear Congressional intent that the
majority of the provisions of the Act be applied to cases pending on the
effective date of the Act. 7 Without ever reconciling the apparent
tension between the Bradley and Bowen presumptions, the court based
its decision on the language of the statute and the "'elementary canon of
construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one

80. Id. at 1374 (finding that "statutes affecting substantive rights 'are ordinarily addressed to
the future and are to be given prospective effect only' (quoting Turner v. United States, 410 F.2d
837, 842 (5th Cir. 1969)).
81. See Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985).
82. Johnson, 965 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985)).
83. Id.
84. Id. Section 101 of the Act abrogated the decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989). See supra note 17 for the text of § 101(b).
85. Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1993); Davis v. City of San
Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1551-52 (9th Cir. 1992); Duplessis v. Training & Dev. Corp., 821
F. Supp. 45, 50 (D. Me. 1993); Bland v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 811 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D. Colo.
1992); Jaekel v. Equifax Mktg. Decision Sys., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 486, 492 (E.D. Va. 1992); Assily
v. Tampa Gen. Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 862, 865 (M.D. Fla. 1992); Graham v. Bodine Elec. Co., 782
F. Supp. 74, 77 (N.D. Il. 1992); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1307-08 (N.D.
Cal. 1992); King v. Shelby Med. Ctr, 779 F. Supp. 157, 158 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
86. 976 F.2d 1536 (9th Cir. 1992). Section 113(b), providing for the award of expert fees was
the provision at issue, which abrogated the Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia Univ. Hosp.,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113(b), 105
Stat. 1071, 1079, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994)).
87. Davis, 976 F.2d at 1550.
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part inoperative."' 8 8 The court decided that the language in sections
109(c) and 402(b)89 providing for explicit prospectivity would be
superfluous, unless the remainder of the Act was interpreted to have a
retroactive effect.9" The court further rejected the analysis of the Eighth
Circuit in Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co.,91 stating that "[t]he fact
that the Act as passed does not contain the explicit retroactivity language
of the 1990 bill appears no more probative than the fact that it omits
language found in the Administration's 1991 bill which would have
expressly provided for the Act's prospective application."'
The District Court for the Northern District of California also held
that the Act was to be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time
of its enactment. The court in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc.93 found that
the language of the Act supports a retroactive interpretation.94 The court
also looked to the legislative history of the Act and noted that "[w]here
'Congress enacts [a] statute to clarify the Supreme Court's interpretation
of previous legislation thereby returning the law to its previous posture,'
the Act must be applied retroactively."9 5 Finally, the court chose to
follow the Ninth Circuit and apply the Bradley presumption of retroactivity.96
In addition, the court in Duplessis v. Training & Development
Corp. 97 also adopted the Bradley presumption. However, its decision
was based on the fact that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act at
issue98 did not "affect substantive rules of conduct." 99 Before conclu-

88. Id. at 1551 (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)).
89. See supranote 29 for the text of these sections. Accord Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985
F.2d 470, 472-76 (9th Cir. 1993).
90. Davis, 976 F.2d at 1551. The court stated that "[w]here Congress intended that certain
sections of the Act should not be applied retroactively, it made specific pronouncements as to those.
We will not render those pronouncements a nullity by holding that the rest of the Act is likewise to
have no retroactive effect." Id. at 1553; see also Reynolds, 985 F.2d 470.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
92. Davis, 976 F.2d at 1554; see H.R. 1375, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 14 (1991) (declaring that
"[t]his Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment. The amendments
made by this Act shall not apply to any claim arising before the effective date of this Act").
93. 780 F,Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
94. Id. at 1305.
95. Id. at 1305 (quoting Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 754-55 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. granted on other grounds, 499 U.S. 958
(1991)).
96. Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1307.
97. 821 F. Supp. 45 (D. Me. 1993).
98. At issue were the provisions providing for the additional remedies of compensatory and
punitive damages, as well as recovery of expert and attorneys fees. Id. at 45-46; see Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 102(a)(1), 113(a), 113(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072, 1079 (codified
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sively deciding that the sections of the Act applied retroactively under
the Bradley presumption, the court first analyzed whether retroactive
application would result in a manifest injustice. To determine whether a
manifest injustice will result, a three-part test was conducted which
involved examining: "'(a) the nature and identity of the parties, (b) the
nature of their rights, and (c) the nature of the impact of the change in
the law upon those rights.""0'' The court found that the nature and
identity of the parties favored prospective application based on the
reasoning of a case in the First Circuit1 ' in which it was stated that
"'if the party against whom the statute is to be applied is a public party,
then the "struggle" against the so-called retroactive application is not as
hard."" 2 Turning to the second prong, the Duplessis court stated that
"this Court does not believe it would be unfair to subject defendants to
higher damages when their conduct violates a standard which has not
been altered .... [W]e do not believe the rights involved demonstrate
03
that retroactive application would result in manifest injustice."'
Finally, "[gliven that the law has never countenanced that an employer
may weigh the legal consequences of his discrimination and choose to
continue his unlawful conduct,"'" the court concluded that no manifest
injustice would result from applying the provisions of the 1991 Act
providing for compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and
expert witness fees retroactively.'
Thus, the federal courts were not only split on the issue of
retroactivity, but even those courts that agreed on the "proper" application of the Act reached their conclusion on entirely different rationales.
It was this uncertainty and inconsistency that led the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Landgrafv. USI Film Products, Inc. and Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc.

as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1994)).
99. Duplessis, 821 F. Supp. at 47. The court referred to the canon of construction set forth in
Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632, 639 (1985), where the Supreme Court stated that ."statutes
affecting substantive rights and liabilities are presumed to have only prospective effect."' Duplessis,
821 F. Supp. at 46.
100. Duplessis, 821 F. Supp. at 46 (quoting Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 717

(1974)).
101. Aledo-Garcia v. Puerto Rico Nat'l Guard Fund, Inc. 887 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1989).
102. Duplessis, 821 F. Supp. at 47 (quoting Aledo-Garcia, 887 F.2d at 356). The court noted
that this principle dates back to Chief Justice Marshall's statement in United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). See supra note 69.
103. Duplessis, 821 F. Supp. at 49.

104. Id.
105. Id. at 50.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS

A. Landgraf v. USI Film Products
In Landgrafv. USI Film Products,' 6 the Court began its analysis
of whether the 1991 Act should be applied to cases pending on the date
of its enactment, with the petitioner, Landgraf's, textual argument based
upon three provisions of the 1991 Act: sections 402(a), 402(b), and
109(c).107 The majority rejected petitioner's argument that sections
109(c) and 402(b) would be entirely superfluous,'0 8 unless it is inferred
that since these two provisions provided for explicit prospective
application, the remainder of the Act was to be applied to cases pending
on the date of its enactment. The Court concluded that it was unlikely
that Congress intended the clause "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically
provided" in section 402(a) to carry such critically important significance."° Rather, "[t]he drafters of a complicated piece of legislation
containing more than 50 separate sections may well have inserted the
'except as otherwise provided' language merely to avoid the risk of an
inadvertent conflict in the statute.""' Furthermore, the Court reasoned
that it was entirely probable that because of Congress's inability to
resolve the retroactivity issue, and because there were conflicting judicial
precedents concerning the retroactivity of a statute when ambiguous
congressional intent exists, Congress wanted to ensure prospective
application of sections 109(c) and 402(b)."'
The Court then turned to the legislative history of the Act and
concluded, as many of the lower federal courts have done, that the
"legislators agreed to disagree.""' Finding no solution to the retroactivity question from the language of the Act or its legislative history, the
Court then confronted the two conflicting canons of construction set forth

106. 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994).
107. Id. at 1483, 1493. See supra note 29 and text accompanying note 28 for the text of these
provisions. See also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text for a brief statement of the case.
108. Landgraf's argument was based on the elementary canon of construction "that a court
should give effect to every provision of a statute and thus avoid redundancy among different provisions." Landgraf 114 S. Ct. at 1494. See supra note 66 for cases supporting this principle.
109. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1494. For a more detailed discussion of petitioner's textual

argument, see supra notes 64-68, 88-90.
110.
11l.
112.
provided

Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1494.
Id. at 1494-95.
Id. at 1496. See supra note 6 for cases noting that the legislative history of the Act
no reliable guidance.
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in Bradley and Bowen." 3 The Court noted that "there is no tension
between the holdings in Bradley and Bowen,"' 4 since the presumption
against retroactivity is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.115 However,
civil legislation may be retroactive if "Congress first make[s] its intention
clear [which] helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the
benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or
unfairness.""16
The Court further indicated that a statute is not made retroactive
merely because it applies to cases where the conduct at issue took place
before the statute's enactment." 7 Rather, "the court must ask whether
the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed
before its enactment.""1 8 It is only then that the presumption against
retroactivity will be invoked. 19 The Court then reconciled Bradley with
the presumption against retroactivity, stating that the attorney's fee
provision at issue in Bradley did not invoke the presumption, since
"[a]ttorney's fee determinations ... are 'collateral to the main cause of
action.'' 2 Therefore, when Congress fails to provide for the intended
application of a statute, a court must first decide if the statute would have
retroactive effect.' 2' For example, a court would decide "whether it
would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed."'" If the statute would not operate retroactively, then Bradley applies. If the statute would operate retroactively, then
it will not apply to cases arising before its enactment, unless there is
clear congressional intent mandating its application. 2 The Court
concluded that section 102 of the Act, which provides for compensatory
and punitive damages as well as a jury trial, is the kind of provision that

113. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1496.
114. Id. (emphasis omitted). The Court noted that its "opinion in Bowen did not purport to
overrule Bradley or to limit its reach." Id. at 1497.
115. See id. at 1496-1501 (discussing statutory retroactivity and constitutional impediments to
same).
116. Id. at 1498; see also id. at 1501 (discussing the instances where "[e]ven absent specific
legislative authorization, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably
proper").

117. Id. at 1499.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Id.at 1503.
121. Id. at 1505.
122. Id.

123. Id.
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would operate retroactively. 24 Absent clear congressional intent to the
contrary, it will not apply to events occurring prior to its enactment.1 25
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority
stating that "[p]erhaps from an eagerness to resolve the 'apparent tension'
between Bradley and Bowen, the Court rejects the 'most logical reading'
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and resorts to a presumption against
retroactivity."' 126 Blackmun premised his opinion on Landgrafs textual
analysis of the language in sections 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c) and
invoked "the 'settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in
such [a] fashion that every word has operative effect."", 127 Blackmun
noted that "if the entire Act were inapplicable to pending cases,
[sections] 402(b) and 109(c) would be 'entirely redundant.' Thus, the
clear implication is that, while [section] 402(b) and [section] 109(c) do
not apply to pending cases, other provisions-including [section]
102--do."'28 He continued that even if a textual analysis does not
support retroactive application, "procedural and remedial statutes [such
as section 102] that do not take away vested rights are presumed to apply
to pending actions."' 29 He concluded that since
[s]ection 102 of the Act expands the remedies available for acts of
intentional discrimination, but does not alter the scope of the
employee's basic right to be free from discrimination ... [t]here is
nothing unjust about holding an employer responsible for injuries
caused by conduct that has been illegal for almost 30 years. 30

124. Id.
125. Id. The Court also noted that each provision of the Act must be analyzed separately, stating
that: "we understand the instruction that the provisions are to 'take effect upon enactment' to mean
that courts should evaluate each provision of the Act in light of ordinary judicial principles
concerning the application of new rules to pending cases and pre-enactment conduct." Id.
126. Id. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
127. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30

(1992)).
128. Id. at 1509 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 1510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.04, at 349 (4th ed. 1986)). Note, however, that Justice Blackmun
did not express an opinion with respect to the punitive damages provision, since "the imposition of
punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct represents a more difficult question, one not squarely
addressed in this case." Id. at 1509 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority of the Court also
noted that "[r]etroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise a serious constitutional
question." Id. at 1505.
130. Id. at 1510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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B. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.
In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,3 1 the Court upheld the
decision of the court of appeals that section 101 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 did not apply retroactively to cases pending at the time of its
enactment.132 Section 101 of the Act codified Congress's disagreement
with the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union,'33 which severely limited the application of the "make and
enforce contracts" clause in 42 U.S.C. § 1981.134 The Court concluded
that the "new legal obligations [section] 101 imposes bring it within the
class of laws that are presumptively prospective."13' 5 In addition to
dismissing the petitioner's textual argument, that was also rejected in
Landgraf,136 the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that "there is
a 'presumption in favor of application of restorative statutes' to cases
arising before their enactment."13' 7 The Court rejected this argument on
the theory that a legislative response does not, by itself, "reveal whether
Congress intends the 'overruling' statute to apply retroactively to events
that would otherwise be governed by the judicial decision."'138 Relying
on the test set forth in Landgraf,139 the Court refused to apply section
101 retroactively, absent a clear expression of congressional intent."4
In interpreting the text of section 101 and its legislative history, the
Court found that it did not support the argument that the purpose of
section 101 was "restorative."'4 Congress's "intent to reach conduct

131. 114 S.Ct. 1510 (1994). See supranotes 14-18 and accompanying text for abrief statement
of the case.
132. Id. at 1514.
133. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
134. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion.
135. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1515.
136. See supra part IV.A. (denoting a detailed discussion of the Court's analysis).
137. Rivers, 114 S.Ct. at 1515 (quoting Petitioner's Brief 37).
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
140. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1516.
141. Id. at 1517. The Court gave significance to the fact that the 1990 version of the bill
specifically stated that "it was intended to 'respond to the Supreme Court's decisions by restoring
the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."' Id. at 1516 (emphasis
added) (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(b)(1)). Compare § 3(4)
of the Civil Rights Act of 199 1, stating that one of the purposes of the Act is "to respond to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Pub. L. No 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat.
1071, 1071 (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994).
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preceding a 'corrective' amendment must clearly appear." 42 Absent
such an intent, as in the instant case, and because section 101 "creates
liabilities that had no legal existence before the Act
was passed, [section]
43
101 does not apply to preenactment conduct."'
Justice Blackmun again wrote a dissenting opinion, setting forth the
basic proposition that since at the time of respondent's discriminatory
conduct, Patterson had not yet limited the interpretation of the "make
and enforce contracts" clause to contract formation, application of section
101 of the Act could not be claimed to disturb the parties vested rights
or settled expectations.'" Blackmun went on to harmonize Bradley,
Bowen, and Bennett, by stating that they can be properly understood as
follows: "Bradley establishes a presumption that new laws apply to
pending cases in the absence of manifest injustice, and Bowen and
Bennett stand for the corresponding presumption against applying new
laws when doing so would cause the very injustice Bradley is designed
to avoid."' 45 Finally, Justice Blackmun noted that "'[w]hen a law
purports to restore the status quo in existence prior to an intervening
Supreme Court decision, the application of that law to conduct occurring
prior to the decision would obviously not frustrate the expectations of the
parties concerning the legal consequences of their actions at that
,146
time.""
C.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Court's Analyses

Consistent with the decisions of a majority of the federal
courts, 47 the Supreme Court held that the Act did not apply retroactively to cases pending at the time of its enactment.' 48 Like many of
the federal courts, the LandgrafCourtbegan its analysis of the issue with
the statutory language of the Act and its legislative history.'49 Although
petitioner's textual argument concerning section 402(a)'s qualifying

142. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1519.
143. Id. at 1519-20. Compare Petitioner's argument that "respondent has no persuasive claim
to unfair surprise, because, at the time the allegedly discriminatory discharge occurred, the Sixth
Circuit precedent held that § 1981 could support a claim for discriminatory contract termination."
Id. at 1517-18 n.9.
144. Id. at 1520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1521 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
146. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886,
907 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Wald, J.,
dissenting)), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1642 (1994)).
147. See supra note 58.
148. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994).

149. Id. at 1493.
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clause "except as otherwise specifically provided"'"5
sive, 5' the Court dismissed this argument stating that

was persua-

[g]iven the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad coverage
of the statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions
in the 1990 bill, it would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to
resolve that question through negative
inferences drawn from two
2
provisions of quite limited effect.1
Perhaps this is the most plausible interpretation, taking into consideration
that the 1990 bill which provided for broad retroactivity provisions was
vetoed by President Bush for its "unfair retroactivity rules."' 5 3 By
contrast, a version of the 1991 bill was specifically rejected due to its
explicit prospectivity provision." Like many of the federal courts, the
Court made the most probable conclusion that the "legislators agreed to
disagree" on the issue of retroactivity 5 5 However, the Court's analysis
fails when it attempts to reconcile the principles set forth in Bradley and
Bowen. In lieu of choosing between the presumptions set forth in these
cases, the Court stated that there was "no tension' ' 5 6 between the two
and attempted to give both of them validity. The Court determined that
a retroactive effect exists only if a provision attaches new legal consequences to conduct that took place before the statute was enacted.' 5 If
new legal consequences would attach, then the presumption against
retroactivity established in Bowen prevails. 5 Impliedly then, if no new
legal consequences would attach, a court must apply Bradley-i.e., "the
law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would
result in [a] manifest injustice.' 59 But the test applied to determine if
there would be a manifest injustice is, in effect, the same as the "new
legal consequences" determination under the Landgrafanalysis.

150. Id. at 1493.

151. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that "[a] straightforward textual analysis of the Act
indicates that [it is applicable] to cases pending on appeal on the date of enactment [since] § 402(a)'s
qualifying clause.... cannot be dismissed as mere surplusage or an 'insurance policy' against future
judicial interpretation." Id. at 1508; see also cases cited supra note 66.
152. Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1493-94.
153. See 136 CONG. Rac. S16,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) (Pres. Bush's veto message
returning without approval S. 2104).
154. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
155. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct at 1496.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1499.
158. Id. at 1505.
159. Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974).
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To determine whether a manifest injustice will result, a court must
examine: "(a) the nature and identity of the parties, (b) the nature of their
rights, and (c) the nature of the impact of the change in law upon those
rights."''
On the face of it, if a provision would attach new legal
consequences to past conduct, then a manifest injustice would result.
Thus, it is difficult to see what the Court's analysis has added to the
Bradley and Bowen principles.
While, I cannot disagree with the Court's conclusion in Landgraf
that the retroactive application of the compensatory and punitive damages
provision of section 102 would attach "new legal consequences" to past
conduct, it is much more difficult to understand the Court's conclusion
in Rivers.
At the time of the discriminatory conduct alleged in Rivers, the
Sixth Circuit interpreted section 1981 claims to apply to discriminatory
contract termination.1 6 Only after the claim was pending did the
Supreme Court announce its decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union 62 which limited that interpretation of the "make and enforce
contracts" clause. Therefore, application of section 101 to the Rivers case
would not attach "new legal consequences" to past conduct. It would
have been logical for the Court to apply the Bradley principle, unless
doing so would result in a "manifest injustice." Of course, there is
nothing manifestly unjust about holding an employer liable for conduct
that was impermissible at the time of its occurrence.
It should also be noted that the decisions in Landgrafand Rivers
have not ended the inquiry of the retroactive application of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. In Landgraf,before analyzing whether section 102
of the Act was to be applied retroactively, the Court stated that:
[T]here is no special reason to think that all the diverse provisions of
the Act must be treated uniformly ....[W]e understand the instruction
that the provisions are to 'take effect upon enactment' to mean that
courts should evaluate each provision of the Act in light of ordinary
judicial principles concerning the application of new rules to pending
cases and pre-enactment conduct.' 63
Therefore, the retroactivity of specific provisions of the 1991 Act

160. Id. at 717.
161. Rivers v. Roadway Express Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 n.9 (1994).
162. 491 U.S. 164 (1989); see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (articulating a
discussion of Pattersonand § 101 of the Act which abrogates its decision).
163. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994).
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will depend on the procedural posture of the case as well as the

particular section of the Act at issue. Thus, in applying the "new'
Landgrafanalysis, there will continue to be room for speculation and
disagreement among the federal courts.
Since the decisions in Landgrafand Rivers, the majority of courts
have found application of the Act to be prospective only."6 Those
cases involving section 1981 claims, also at issue in Rivers, have found
the Court's holding dispositive of the issue and have not applied section
101 of the 1991 Act to claims accruing before the effective date of the
enactment. 65
However, there are some courts that have recognized the limitations
of the decisions in Landgraf and Rivers, and have therefore applied
sections of the Act retroactively, depending upon the timing of the
discriminatory conduct and the commencement of the case. For example,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri has recognized the
limitations of the holdings in Landgraf and Rivers."6 In Schulte v.
ConsolidatedFreightways Corp., the court had to decide the application
of section 102 of the Act 67 where the conduct at issue arose before the
effective date of the enactment, but the complaint was filed postenactment. The court acknowledged that "[s]ince by its terms Landgraf

164. See Woolf v. Bowles, 57 F.3d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 1995); Rutland v. Moore, 54 F.3d 226,
230 (5th Cir. 1995); Cross v. Department of Mental Health, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11 th Cir. 1995);
Maitland v. University of Minn., 43 F.3d 357, 363 (8th Cir. 1994); Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve
Co., 40 F.3d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1994); Chenault v. United States Postal Service, 37 F.3d 535, 536
(9th Cir. 1994); Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kan., 36 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1994); Preston v.
Virginia, 31 F.3d 203,208 (4th Cir. 1994); Fair Employment Council, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.,
28 F.3d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1994);
Steinle v. Boeing Co., 24 F.3d 1250, 1251 (10th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co.,
871 F. Supp. 305, 309 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Martinez v. Ketchum Advertising Co., 865 F. Supp. 166,
168 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Honea v. SGS Control Servs. Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (E.D. Tex. 1994);
Velich v. Runyon, 860 F. Supp. 1342, 1345 n.2 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
165. See Boone v. Federal Express Corp., 59 F.3d 84, 86 (8th Cir. 1995); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc.,
47 F.3d 676, 679 (4th Cir. 1995); Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc., 45 F.3d 258, 261 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 102 (1995); Nickeo v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 42 F.3d 804, 806 (3d Cir. 1994);
Duane v. GEICO, 37 F.3d 1036, 1038 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1251 (1995), and
cert. dismissed, 115 S.Ct. 2272 (1995); Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 n.3 (5th Cir.
1994); Simons v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 28 F.3d 1029, 1030 (10th Cir. 1994); Rodriguez v.
General Motors Corp., 27 F.3d 396, 399 (9th Cir. 1994); Pitchford v. Kitchens, 873 F. Supp. 167,
169 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Greene v. United Parcel Serv., 864 F. Supp. 48, 52 (N.D. Ill. 1994);
Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
166. See Schulte v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., No. 4:93CVI 156, 1994 WL 395410 (E.D.
Mo. May 10, 1994).
167. Id. at 1-2. Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 contains the compensatory and
punitive damages provision that was also at issue in Landgraf.
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is specifically limited to cases where both the wrongful conduct and the
filing of the suit occurred before November 21, 1991, it ... is not
strictly on point."' 68 However, the court concluded that Landgrafwas
instructive and provided a "compelling rationale" towards the conclusion
that, even in these circumstances, the Act should not be applied
retroactively.' 69
Likewise, in McQueen v. Marsh Supermarkets, T° the District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that plaintiff was not
entitled to application of section 102 of the 1991 Act, where the unlawful
termination occurred on November 11, 1991, ten days prior to the
effective date of the Act.' 7 ' Conversely, the District Court of Colorado
has held that a plaintiff is entitled to seek the additional remedies
afforded by the passage of the 1991 Act provided the action was
commenced after the effective date of the 1991 Act, regardless of when
the discriminatory conduct took place."
The District Court of Maryland was faced with a scenario in which
the discriminatory conduct occurred both before and after the effective
date of the 1991 Act and the complaint was filed post-enactment. 173 Although the court recognized that Landgrafinvolved a case in which the
action was pending on the effective date of the enactment and all the
discriminatory conduct took place prior to the 1991 Act, the court
concluded that Landgrafproposed that new laws affecting substantive
liabilities should not be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred
prior to their enactment.' 74 Accordingly, in determining the proper
application of section 102 of the Act, the court found that the plaintiff
was entitled to compensatory and punitive damages for that retaliatory
conduct that took place subsequent to the 1991 Act, but not for the
conduct which occurred prior to November 21, 1991.,7

168. Schulte, 1994 WL 395410 at *1 (denoting the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of
1991).
169. Id. at *2.
170. 883 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Ind. 1994).

171. Id. at 332.
172. See Craig v. O'Leary, 870 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Colo. 1994) (limiting the holdings in
Landgrafand Rivers as applicable to cases pending at the time the 1991 Act was enacted).
173. See Munday v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Md. 1994).
174. Id. at 1376 n.5.
175. Id at 1378-79; see also Mills v. Amoco Performance Prods., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 975, 985
(S.D. Ga. 1994) (stating that "the Supreme Court made clear that the remedial provisions of the 1991
Act for compensatory and punitive damages and trial by jury do not apply to pre-enactment
conduct," thus only permitting plaintiff to recover damages for that conduct which occurred postenactment (emphasis added)).
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To the contrary, in Boyce v. Board of Commissioners76 the
District Court of Kansas held that section 102 of the 1991 Act was
applicable to plaintiff's action, distinguishing Landgraf,since the case
was not pending on the date of enactment and the discriminatory conduct
occurred both before and after the effective date.177 However, rather
than fragmenting the retaliatory conduct into pre- and post-Act conduct
like the court in Munday v. Waste Management., Inc.,'78 the court
merely held that plaintiff was entitled to recover compensatory damages. 7 9 It is this disparity in result that the rulings in Landgraf and
Rivers were intended to prevent. As exemplified in the above discussion,
there continues to be inconsistent application of the 1991 Act, depending
upon the forum court's interpretation of the holdings in Landgrafand
Rivers, the procedural posture of the case, and the period of
discriminatory conduct.
As a result of the Court's holdings, many claims of employment
discrimination that occurred prior to November 21, 1991 will be without
redress. From the viewpoint of the employer/businessman this decision
is equitable, since an employer is entitled to conduct his business affairs
with full knowledge of the legal consequences of his actions. However,
there is something disingenuous about permitting an employer to violate
another's civil rights while giving him a reliance interest in the extent of
his liability. That is, should we permit an employer to conduct a costbenefit analysis of his actions?' 80 For example, in Landgraf although
the respondent's conduct was discriminatory both before and after the
1991 Act, the Court refused to apply the Act retroactively because at the
time of the alleged conduct, Ms. Landgraf was only entitled to equitable
relief under Title VII, and not compensatory and punitive damages under
section 102 of the 1991 Act."'
However, from the viewpoint of the "wronged" employee it is a
greater injustice to permit this conduct to take place without any

176.
177.
178.
179.

857 F. Supp. 794 (D. Kan. 1994).
Id. at 797 n.1.
858 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Md. 1994).
Boyce, 857 F. Supp. at 787; see also Park v. Howard Univ., 863 F. Supp. 14, 17 (D.D.C.

1994) (permitting recovery of compensatory damages where the discriminatory conduct was of a
continuing nature spanning the periods both before and after the effective date of the 1991 Act).
180. When a person's civil liberties are at issue, should our analysis be similar to the analysis
developed by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) (explaining B<PL--ifthe burden (B) of adequate precaution is less than the probability
(P) and gravity of the harm (L)-then it would be negligence not to take that extra precaution)?
181. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1506-08 (1994).
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ramifications. After all, since the first Civil Rights Act of 1866 the
legislature has continuously been working towards protecting civil rights.
Since the legislature responded to a number of 1989 court decisions
which curtailed these rights and, therefore, abrogated the decisions, it
would seem consistent with their action to further protect these rights by
permitting retroactive application. Yet, as a consequence of the Court's
decisions, in many cases an employee will be without redress because of
the fortuitous timing of his employer's discriminatory actions, or in some
cases, the unfortunate circumstance that the employee's attorney filed the
complaint on November 20, 1991, and not November 22, 1991.182
V.

CONCLUSION

After two years of debate in Congress and three years of indecision
in the federal courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
controversial issue of retroactivity which plagued the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. However, rather than resolving the issue, the Court
has handed down another test that the federal courts must apply when
deciding the retroactivity of specific provisions of the Act.
It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that the legislative
branch of government could not agree on the retroactivity issue. Instead,
Congress left the decision to the judiciary. However, in the Court's
decisions in Landgrafand Rivers, the Supreme Court failed in its duty
as "final arbiter." 183 As a result of the narrow holdings in these two
cases, there continues to be room for disagreement and speculation
among the federal courts, until all cases in which the conduct took place
before the effective date of the Act have been fully litigated.
Linda B. Contino

182. See Craig v. O'Leary, 870 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Colo. 1994), discussed supra note 172
and accompanying text. Contra McQueen v. Marsh Supermarkets, 883 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Ind.
1994), discussed supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
183, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
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